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6. Keynes 's View of Economics as a 
Moral Science1 
J.B. Davis 
J .M. Keynes' s theoretical understanding of economic method is one of 
tbe less well understood dimensions of bis thought, both because 
Keynes's thinking, unlike that of most economists, was motivated by 
serious reftection on philosophical questions, and because Keynes's 
particular philosophical beritage- rooted as it was in early reftections on 
the pbilosopber G .E. Moore' s Principia Ethica (Skidelsky, 198 3) - was 
quite different from that of other Cambridge economists. Accordingly, 
although Keynes repeated the Cambridge view that economics is 'es-
sentially a moral science and nota natural science' (CW, XIV, p. 297), 
that bis own understanding of this notion and the method of economics 
bad its origins in Keynes's own distinctive philosophical development 
perhaps suggests that Keynes transformed the Cambridge understanding 
of economic method, much as he transformed its conception of the 
economy. 
lndeed, the methodological thinking of the Cambridge school did 
undergo considerable change in the space of three generations. At the 
end of the nineteenth century, Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Marshall, and 
John Neville Keynes, while hesitant to say economics sought universal 
laws on the model of natural science, nonetheless agreed that the 
empirical generalization of well established facts was a meaningful 
enterprise. M oreo ver, while each was aware of the role of val u e judgements 
in economics, there were few doubts conceming the validity of the 
normative-positive distinction, sin ce N assau Senior bad cometo underlie 
the idea of economics asan objective intellectual enterprise (Hutchison, 
1981, pp. 46-62). By contrast, by the mid-twentieth century, it could 
well be said that many at Cambridge, in the words .of Joan Robinson, 
bel ieved that 'the positive and norma ti ve [ could not] be sharply divided' 
(Robinson, 1962, p. 74), and that empirical work in economics was 
fraugbt with sucb difficulty that it could hardly be granted the role hoped 
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for it at the beginning of the century. Jobn Maynard Keynes, then, in 
virtue of bis ties to both the earlier and later Cambridge economists, 
might naturally be thought the pivota! figure in this development. 
Yet that Keynes's early philosophical thinking was largely formed 
under the impact of a reading of Moore 's Principia, ratber than in a 
conscientious study of the methodological convictions of the first gen-
eration of Cambridge economists, al so suggests that Keynes 's impact on 
the development of Cambridge methodological thinking may well have 
been relatively slight, given the fact that most economists at Cambridge 
after Keynes were either unacquainted witb Moore's thought or simply 
uninterested in it. From this perspective, it might well be surmised that 
Keynes' s considerable prestige, combined witb his often severe criticism 
ofhis predecessors, discouraged interest in earliermethodological views, 
while, because Keynes' s own early intellectual development was highly 
specific to a relatively prívate early philosophical experience, those 
attracted to Keynes's economic theories found it difficult to understand, 
or indeed feel mucb sympathy toward, those philosophical notions that 
ultimately carne to underlie bis view of economics as a moral science. In 
effect, later Cambridge economists had to innovate methodologically on 
a rather narrow doctrinal base, portions of which were likely to be 
altogether unappealing; and this, it could be concluded, makes a case for 
metbodological discontinuity rather tban development in the thinking 
about economics in tbe Cambridge scbool. 
Moore, it is interesting to note, was a stugent of Sidgwick's in ethics 
at tbe turn ofthe century, and thus might líáve reinforced the Sidgwick-
Marshall-Neville Keynes tradition in metbodological thinking for J.M. 
Keynes. However, Sidgwick, whose seven-edition The Methods ofEthics 
was meant. to synthesize the competing nineteenth-century moral phi-
losophy traditions of J.S. Mill's utilitarianism and William Whewell's 
intuitionism (mucb as Marshall's authoritative Principies was meant to 
do for economics), never persuaded Moore that utilitarianism was co-
herent. As a result, Moore was to go on to revive the longstanding 
Cambridge Platonist tradition in bis intuitionist Principia, and this set of 
ideas accordingly became the basis for Keynes 's own early pbilosophical 
views. Indeed, Keynes's first major work, his Treatise on Probability, 
acknowledged (CW, VII, p. 20) and drew heavily on these Moorean 
beginnings (see O 'Donnell, 1989a). In effect, then, Keynes' s early philo-
sophical thinking reached ba{;k in time over the first generation of 
Cambridge economists to a prior intellectual tradition at Cambridge. 
While this is arguably the reason Keynes' s thinking about economic 
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method has rarely been well explained, at the same time such beginnings 
provide new opportunities and resources for explaining Keynes' s meth-
odological thinking. What, then, were Keynes' s early philosophical 
positions as they might relate to Keynes' s la ter understanding of eco-
nomic method? 
KEYNES AND INDIVIDUAL JUDGEMENT 
Keynes 's 1938 characterization of economics as a moral science depends 
centrally upon conceiving economics as an art. In believing economics 
as art, however, one gives up the customary, natural science view of 
scientific method whereby one assumes individual instances are assimi-
lated under general principies in relatively unproblematic fashion, and 
in its place rests greater emphasis u pon the economist' s capacity to 
exercise individual judgement regarding the novelty of the particular 
instance and the significance of data generally. Keynes suggests this in 
his 1938 statement in asserting that economics is 'a branch of logic, a 
way ofthinking' (CW, XIV, p. 297), and by emphasizing his conception 
ofwhat was involved in working with models of economic relationships. 
On this view, 'it is the essence of a model that one does not fill in real 
values for the variable functions' since todo this was to deprive a model 
of 'its generality and its value as a mode of thought' (Ibid.). Thus, an 
economic model for Keynes possesses an important element of inde-
terminacy which demands a capacity for individual judgement. 
These convictions recall Keynes' s earlier interest in individualjudge-
ment in his first reftections upon Moore's Principia. In his unpublished 
1904 'Ethics in Relation to Conduct' paper, Keynes noted that Moore's 
recommendation to follow general cornmonsense rules of conduct when 
estimating the probable remo te future effects of one' s actions was often 
-of little value when past experience bore little relation to the future. 
Indeed, Keynes went on to argue, probability statements ought not to be 
understood as simply registering what has occurred in sorne given 
proportion of past cases - in effect, the frequency theory of probability 
- but rather should be thought to represent one' s estímate of the 
justification needed to make sorne statement, given the evidence at one' s 
disposal. This implies that, even when one possesses sorne record ofpast 
experience regarding the likelihood of a future event, that evidence must 
nonetheless still be evaluated for its bearing on the conclusion at hand. 
Individual judgement accordingly took on particular significance for 
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Keynes from the outset of bis intellectual career, so that, unlike others in 
the early Cambridge methodological tradition, Keynes always evidenced 
a considerable scepticism toward the use of a posteriori general prin-
cipies in economics. 
Keynes, bowever, was by no means of the opinion that legitimate 
general principies were non-existent. When, after sorne de la y, he finally 
published bis first and only pbilosopbical study, the Treatise on Prob-
ability, Keynes asserted that probability relationsbips concemed 'a 
logical relation between two sets ofpropositions' (CW, VII, p. 9), and 
that 'logic investigates the general principies ofvalid thought' ( CW, VII, 
p. 3). What Keynes principally inherited from Moore, in fact, was the 
view that one could intuit, or grasp, in an act of individual judgement, 
general a priori relationsbips. This bad been the central doctrine of 
Principia Ethica, where Moore bad advanced the view that the good was 
sui generis and could only be grasped in and of itself. It was also the key 
position in Keynes's Treatise, wbere Keynes asserted that it was not 
possible to define probability, and tbat our knowledge of probability 
relationsbips depends upon our 'direct acquaintance' with logical rela-
tions between propositions (CW, VII, p. 13). 
At the same time, in Keynes' s mind this 'direct acquaintance' with the 
logical relationships between propositions retained an important con-
nection with individual judgement. In arguing that probability relation-
sbips were objective and logical, Keynes had asserted that propositions 
were not probable in and of themselves, but rather only probable in 
relation toa particular body of knowledge ~bodied in otber proposi-
tions. This implied, he noted, that probability theory possesses both 
subjective and objective dimensions, since 
... [W]hat particular propositions we selectas the premisses of our argument 
naturally depends on subjective factors peculiar to ourselves, [while] the 
relations, in which other propositions stand to these, and which entitle us to 
probable beliefs, are objective and logical (CW, VII, p. 4). 
One's 'direct acquaintance' with the logical relations between proposi-
tions, then, depends importantly upon one's judgement concerning the 
evidence relevant to the desired probability judgement, since were our 
'premisses' to cbange, we would generally discover ourselves directly 
acquainted with altogether different probability relationships. Keynes, 
in fact, took this to be a particular strength of his account. 
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Reftection will show that this account harmonises with familiar experience. 
There is nothing novel in the supposition that the probability of a theory tums 
upon the evidence by which it is supported; and it is common to assert that 
an opinion was probable on the evidence first at hand, but on further 
information was untenable. As our knowledge or our hypothesis changes, 
our conclusions have new probabilities, not in themselves, but relatively to 
these new premises (CW, VII, p. 8). 
Thus, although the knowledge of probability relationships is a knowl-
edge of general a priori logical principies, for Keynes this knowledge 
depends significantly u pon the exercise of individual judgernent. 
All of this, Keynes went on to allow, irnposes a certain relativity on 
probable knowledge that rnany rnightwell surmise undermines the objective 
character of that know ledge. 
Sorne part of knowledge- knowledge of our own existence or of our own 
sensations- is clearly relative to individual experience. We cannot speak of 
knowledge absolutely- only of the knowledge of a particular person. Other 
parts of knowledge- know ledge of the axioms of logic, for example -m ay 
seem more objective. But we must admit, 1 think, that this too is relative to 
the constitution of the human mind, and that the constitution of the human 
mind may vary in sorne degree from manto man. What is self-evident tome 
and what 1 really know, may be only a probable beliefto you, or rnay form 
no part of your rational beliefs at all. And this rnay be true not only of such 
things as my existence, but of sorne logical axiorns al so. Sorne rnen- indeed 
it is obviously the case- rnay have a greater power of logical intuition than 
others (CW, VII, p. 14). 
Keynes hirnself, of course, had little doubt that probability relationships 
were indeed objective. Yet whether this is the case, or whether Keynes 
was justified in thinking probability relationships objective, is not at 
issue here. Rather what is irnportant to establish in the present context is 
whether there is a connection between this early ernphasis Keynes places 
on individual judgernent and what Keynes later understands about the 
need for individual judgernent in econornic rnodels. 
Certainly there is sorne question regarding whether or not Keynes's 
early philosophical thinking in this regard underlies his later thinking 
about econornic rnethod. In a later rnemoir, 'M y Early Beliefs', Keynes 
repudiated sorne of his earliest philosophical thinking, especially in 
regard to his early expressions of confidence conceming the unirnportance 
of relying on rules in judging what was right or wrong to do ( CW, X, p. 
446). Yet, although this rnight well seem to irnply that less ernphasis 
should be placed on the role of individual judgement in Keynes's later 
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methodological thinking, or that individual judgement has an altogether 
different meaning for Keynes in his later work, the fact that in the same 
year (1938) as bis 'M y Early Beliefs' memo ir Keynes also emphasized 
the importance of economists' capacity for individual judgement in his 
moral science characterization ofeconomics suggests thathis 'M y Early 
Beliefs' critique was only concerned with the need to reassess the role of 
individualjudgement in ethics proper. What is there then in what Keynes 
believes, distinctive of economics as a moral science that might be 
explained by Keynes's earlier philosophical ideas? 
KEYNES ON INTROSPECTION AND WDGEMENTS 
OFVALUE 
In bis 1938 characterization of economics as a moral science Keynes had 
also noted that economists make important use of introspection and 
judgements of value in their elaboration of economic models. 
1 also want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral 
science. 1 mentioned before that it deals with introspection and with val u es. 
1 might have added that it deals with motives, expectations, psychological 
uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against treating the material 
as constant and homogeneous (CW, XIV, p. 300). 
Economics is a moral science, then, because it is principally concemed 
with individuals' 'motives, expectations, [and] psychological uncer-
tainties'. This explains why its subject matter is neither 'constant' nor 
'homogeneous' and why the methods of natural science are inappropriate 
in economics. In effect, individuals' observed behaviour corre lates in 
varying degree with their inner thoughts and iqtentions, so that econo-
mists must make significant use of introspectióiÍ and judgements of val u e 
to be able to model individuals' behaviour. Introspection would enable 
the economist to ascribe motives to individuals, given their observed 
behaviour; and judgements of value would enable the economist to 
weigh the strength of individuals' commitments to various courses of 
action they have undertaken. Indeed, by consulting one's own case the 
economist could be expected to be able to 'segregat~ the semi-permanent 
or relatively constant factors from those which are transitory or ftuctuating' 
(CW, XIV, pp. 296-7), since one would presumably have a clearer sense 
of an individual's motives by examining one's own likely motives in 
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similar circumstances than by examining that individual' s observed 
behaviour. 
This perspective on ·economic method, as is well known, was not 
original to Keynes. The earlier Cambridge tradition ofSidgwick, Marshall 
and Neville Keynes had also emphasized introspection and judgements 
of value in economic method, although not much attention was devoted 
to examining the assumptions inherent in so doing. 2 Maynard Keynes, 
however, had good reason to think more carefully about the presuppo-
sitions of employing these methods, since introspection and judgements 
of value necessarily involve the exercise of individual judgement. That 
is, were one to assess another's motives by comparison with one's own 
case, this would clearly involve consulting one's own particularreaction 
to the particular circumstances encountered by another. Although rea-
soning by analogy in this manner certainl y presupposes sorne know ledge 
of general relationships between individuals and their circumstances, 
the idea of case-by-case comparisons is nonetheless one that funda-
mentally concems individual judgement. 
Of course, there is much that is obscure in the idea of describing 
another's thoughts and intentions on the basis of one's own, and conse-
quently whether it makes sense to say one can consult one' s own case in 
order to evaluate that of others is not easily answered. On the one hand, 
if we are entirely unique and distinct individuals, then our individual 
circumstances will not be comparable. 3 On the other hand, if we do not 
differ significantly in our personal motives and valuations, then our 
behaviour should be sufficiently similar and transparent that it could well 
be treated as 'constant and homogeneous'. Keynes, of course, rejected 
this latter alternative. Indeed, his resistance toa natural science conception 
of economics stemmed precisely from his conviction that individuals 
were insufficiently similar in experience and circumstance for their 
thoughts and intentions to be predicted solely on the basis of their 
observable behaviour. How, then, was he able to argue that individuals 
were unique and distinct, and that at the same time introspective 
individual judgement was meaningful? Here, attention to Keynes's 
early philosophical thinking is again valuable. 
Shortly after bis first critique of Moore 's Principia Ethica in his 1904 
'Ethics in Relation to Conduct', Keynes completed two additional 
papers on the Principia for presentation to the Apostles, 'Miscellanea 
Ethica', dated July-September 1905 and 'A Theory of Beauty ', dated 
September-October 1905. Although the papers investiga te a number of 
difficulties in Moore's reasoning, for our purposes here, Keynes's con-
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clusions regarding the proper application ofMoore' s principie of organic 
unities is of particular interest. Moore' s principie of organic unities 
concemed the philosophical relationship between the value of a whole 
and the value of its parts, and stated that the value of 'a whole bears no 
regularproportion to the sum ofthe values of its parts' (Moore, 1903, p. 
27). On the basis of this, Moore had gone on to argue that the universe 
as a whole constitutes an organic unity, and that it was accordingly one 's 
moral duty to promote the good of the universe itself. Keynes found this 
conclusion unrealistic on the grounds that it made nonsense of the idea 
of moral duty. He then reasoned that the universe is not the organic whole 
whose value is at issue in ethics, and that this indicated that, where value 
is concemed, the principie of organic unities is only properly applied to 
the individual mind. 
In ethical calculation each individual 's momentary state of mind is our so le 
unit. In so far as a state ofmind has parts, to this extent I admit the principie 
of organic unities: it is the excellence of the state as a whole with which we 
are concemed. But beyond each individual the organic principie cannot 
reach.4 
That is, the individual mind alone can be said to constitute an organic 
unity and, accordingly, moral duty only concemed promoting good 
states of mind in individuals. 
The implications ofKeynes 's position, however, go beyond questions . 
of ethics. That the individual mind is an organic unity implies both that 
its activity can only be explained in terms of principies appropriate to it 
as a whole and that the mind's parts - an individual's thoughts and 
feelings- are themselves principally to be explained in terms of the 
activity of the individual mind as a whole. Moreover, that for Keynes 
every individual mind constitutes an organic unity in and of itself, and 
that organic connection does not apply acros~Jndividual minds implies 
that the principies that govem relationships between individual minds 
are different in nature from those appropriate to the individual mind. In 
effect, then, Keynes's redirection and reapplication of Moore's princi-
pies of organic unities effectively establishes a principie of autonomy for 
the individual as well as the foundations for an account of the nature of 
relationships between individuals. Individuals are distinct by virtue of 
the personal integrity of their mental experience, although, in a manner 
still to be explained, they share this autonomy with one another. 
More formally, Keynes's redirection of Moore's organic unities 
principie provided Keynes with rudimentary criteria for individuating 
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the individual economic agent via the determination ofthe conditions for 
individual identity through change. Generally speaking, one can claim 
one has successfully distinguished an individual of any sort when one 
can trace a set of characteristics that identify that individual through a 
period of change in other characteristics of that individual. Keynes 's 
ascriptio~ of an organic unity to the mental contents of an individual 
accomplishes this since, though an individual's particular thoughts and 
feelings certainly change, for Keynes, because the individual mind always 
constitutes an organic unity and an individual' s thoughts identify that 
individual, this implies that an individual' s new thoughts and feelings 
remain the thoughts and feelings of that same individual. 
This is of no little import. Although individuals are conventionally 
taken to be different and distinct from one another ( often by virtue of 
their physical distinctiveness ), whether one can in fact justify this distinc-
tiveness is crucial to any methodological strategy that depends upon 
assessing the thinking and motives of others. Indeed, possessing criteria 
for individual identity is indispensable to any coherent explanation of 
introspection andjudgements ofvalue, since these methods presuppose 
sorne degree of intellectual autonomy on the part of the individual having 
recourse to them, in order to justify the claim that individuals can treat 
their own cases as a source of independent information regarding the 
motives and intentions underlying the observed behaviour of others. Put 
simply, the elaboration of individual identity criteria is a necessary, 
though not sufficient, condition for employing the methods of introspec-
tion and judgements of value. Such criteria are not sufficient in them-
selves, however, because establishing the distinctiveness of an indi-
vidual' s thought process does not al so establish the representativeness of 
that thought process. That is, introspection and judgements of value can 
only be said to be authoritative if the thinking of the individual making 
such judgements can be said to be both distinct from and representative 
of the thinking of those individuals in economic life whose behaviour is 
to be explained. Does Keynes, then, also have a conception of the 
representative individual that would permit the economist taking his or 
her imagined responses to a set of circumstances confronted by others as 
typical of those individuals' likely responses to those circumstances? 
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KEYNES AND 'THE APPROXIMA TE UNIFORMITY 
. OF HUMAN ORGANS' 
From quite early in his intellectual career Keynes did indeed struggle to 
define a sense in which an individual's thinking could be said to be 
typical of the thinking of individuals generally. Although, arguably, 
Keynes felt sorne difficulty in establishing this latter dimension ofhuman 
thought (see Davis, 1991), nonetheless he clearly believed that an indi-
vidual' s thinking could be explained both in terms of a capacity for 
individual judgement reftecting u pon that individual' s own particular 
experience and a capacity to reason in a manner that might be said 
objective in an intersubjective sense. This is apparent in Keynes 's 1905 
'Miscellanea Ethica' paper, where Keynes draws a distinction between 
what an individual can think and feel and what an individual ought to 
think and feel. 
[l]t is plain that the idea and the emotion appropriate to any given sensation 
are partly dependent on the nature aild past history of the individual who 
feels. This is obvious enough; we ought not all to have precisely similar 
states in similar physical circumstances; common sense and the 
commandments are agreed on that. But we can in many cases abstract that 
element which ought to vary from man to man. Assuming the approximate 
uniformity of human organs, we can often - say what, apart from peculiar 
circumstances, aman ought to think and feel:- not indeed what he can think 
and feel- that will always depend upon his nature and his past. 
Thus Keynes allows a role for individual judgement, but also supposes 
that one can often say what another individual would likely think and 
feel, on the grounds that there exists an 'approximate uniformity of 
human organs '. Since individuals possess essentially the same consti-
tution, it is not unreasonable to say that we often anticipate what another 
will think and do under normal circumstance-&,_although this does not of 
course preclude unexpected behaviour on the part of individuals, since 
an individual' s behaviour is also to be explained by his or her 'nature and 
past history'. But economics surely is con cerned with explaining average 
behaviour and thus, on Keynes' s view, the economist would not be 
unjustified in supposing introspection and judgements of value produce 
defensible opinions about agents' motives and intentions. 
This notion of a common intellectual and motivational constitution, 
it should be noted, has already been seen to underlie Keynes's thinking 
in his Treatise on Probability. There Keynes asserts that 'logic investí-
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gates the general principies of valid thought' which form the basis for 
rational belief. While probability judgements do possess a subjective 
dimension in the mdividual's selection of premises, this should not 
obscure the objective character of probability in Keynes 's view. 
But in the sense important to logic, probability is not su bjective. It is not, that 
is to say, subject to human caprice. A proposition is not probable beca use we 
think it so. When once the facts are given which determine our knowledge, 
what is probable or improbable in the circumstances has been fixed objectively, 
and is independent of our opinion. The theory of probability is logical, 
therefore, because it is concerned with the degree of belief which it is 
rational to entertain in given conditions, and not merely with the actual 
beliefs ofparticularindividuals, which may ormay not be rational ( CW, VIII, 
p. 4). 
Keynes 's position in this regard, it is true, is not invulnerable to the 
considerable emphasis Keynes also placed on individual judgement in 
the Treatise, especially inhis above noted discussion of 'the relativity of 
knowledge to the individual' (VIll, p. 18). Yet at the same time, Keynes 
obviously saw two dimensions to an individual' s thinking - subjective 
and objective sides- and this conviction is what is at issue in an analysis 
of bis claims for economics as a moral science. 
lndeed, when Keynes carne to confront F .P. Ramsey 's criticism of the 
Treatise on Probability as indefensibly objectivist, Keynes allowed that 
there was something to Ramsey's complaint, while still insisting that 
Ramsey 's account of probabilities as subjective was nonetheless lacking 
in an important regard. 
Ramsey argues, as against the view which 1 put forward, that probability is 
concerned not with objective relations between propositions but (i•i sorne 
sense) with degrees ofbelief, and he succeeds in showing that the calculus 
of probabilities simply amounts to a set of rules for ensuring that the system 
of degrees of belief which we hold shall be a consistent system. Thus the 
calculus of probabilities belongs to formallogic. But the basis of our degrees 
of belief- or the a priori probabilities, as they u sed to be called- is part of 
our human outfit, perhaps given to us merely by natural selection, analogous 
to our perceptions and our memories rather than to formallogic ( CW, X, pp. 
338-9). 
Thus, although it may not be possible to speak of objective probability 
relations between propositions in the manner desired in the Treatise, for 
Keynes e ven Ramsey 's view should not be regarded as a full y subjective 
one, since it still presupposes 'our human outfit' is somehow responsible 
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for the rules that define the calculus of probabilities. How 'our human 
outfit' might function to produce a coherent, intersubjective calculus of 
probabilities, admittedly, is not explained by Keynes. It is clear, nonethe-
less, that despite the considerable weight Keynes placed on individual 
judgement in bis philosophical thinking, this somehow always operated 
against a backdrop of intersubjective intellectual capacity among indi-
viduals. 
This emphasis should be placed in proper perspective. When Keynes 
argued in 1938 that economics is a moral science, he specifically con-
trasted bis view to that of Lionel Robbins, who Keynes characterized as 
supporting the view that economics is a natural science (CW, XIV, p. 
297). Robbins, of course, is especially well known for bis An Essay on 
the Nature and Signijicance of Economic Science argument that ínter-
personal comparisons of utility are inappropriate in economics if eco-
nomics is to be regarded as a science (1935; 1938). For Robbins, ínter-
personal utility comparisons essentially depend u pon value judgements, 
and value judgements, in contrast to judgements of a factual nature, are 
not verifiable and thus not scientific (1935, pp. 148-9). Robbins's 
critique had a drama tic impact on economists when it appeared, since it 
created significant doubts among economists concerning the legitimacy 
of redistributive social welfare policies, which had been standard in 
economics since Marshall. lndeed, Robbins's argument was an impor-
tant stimulus to Ro y Harrod' s Presidential Address to Section F of the 
British Association, 'S cope and Method of Economics ', which was 
published in the September 1938 Economic Journal. Keynes's own re- · 
marks about Robbins and economics carne in correspondence with 
Harrod prior to the latter's August presentation of the Address. Robbins 
also responded to Harrod in a December 1938 Economic Journal com-
ment. 
Accordingly, that Keynes argued that economics is a moral science, 
and that it justifiably employs introspection aQd Judgements of value ( or 
value judgements), should be taken to stand in direct opposition to 
Robbins's position. In claiming one can consult one's own imagined 
reaction to given circumstances, and then analogically assess the motives 
and intentions of economic agents whose behaviour is to be explained, 
Keynes confronts essentially the same issues that Robbins addressed in 
arguing against interpersonal utility comparisons. Moreover, it might 
well be said that the focus of the issue for Keynes- as clearly it is for 
Robbins- is whether it is methodologically reasonable to make value 
judgements in economics, since Keynes allows that introspection also 
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involves judgements ofvalue, when one assessesthe strengtb or force of 
a presumed motive ascribed toa given economic agent analogicall y from 
one 's own case. How, then, might Keynes bave justified bis proposed 
reliance on judgements of value (or value judgements) in ligbt of 
Robbins 's assertion that sucb judgements cannot be scientific? 
First, Keynes, from the time of bis 1904 'Ethics in Relation to 
Conduct' critique of Moore 's reliance on the frequency theory of prob-
ability, clearly believed that the evidence potentially favourable to a 
given proposition always requires interpretation. This implies that 
individual judgement is indispensable to empirical argument, and also 
tbat judgements of value are involved in an investigator' s assessment of 
the quality and significance of evidence at band. On tbis view, Robbins' s 
model of an a posteriori verification of empirical propositions - where 
the facts effectively speak for themselves - misrepresents scientific 
practice, since empirical verification lacks the exceptional standing 
claimed for it and does not offer a clear metbodological altemative to 
using judgements of value. Second, bowever, Keynes unlike Robbins, 
believed tbat judgements of value could be reasonably objective, and 
that this provided positive justification for their (selective) use in 
economics. Keynes early on argued, in bis 'Miscellanea Ethica' paper, 
tbat a reapplication of Moore' s organic unities principie made it possible 
to ground moral judgements more securely than Moore bad done in his 
Principia Ethica, and tbus that moral judgements could generally be 
thougbt objective. This conclusion was supported by Keynes 's distinction 
between wbat one actually thinks and feels and wbat one ougbt to tbink 
and feel. Althougb certainly it is not always straightforward bow these 
are distinguished, nonetheless in Keynes's view there is a difference 
between them. In contrast, it is fair to say tbat from Robbins's point of 
view ,judgements ofvalue are invariably associated with wbat individuals 
bappen to think and feel, since there is no agreed-upon manner- no 
method of verification- in which one can say how one ougbt to think and 
feel. · 
Indeed, it is tbe willingness or unwillingness to claim that a genuine 
difference exists between what one actually thinks and feels and what 
one ougbt to think and feel that separates the respective positions of 
Robbins and Keynes on the use of introspection as a metbodological 
strategy in economics. Robbins, in bis critique of interpersonal utility 
comparisons, argued tbat there was no means oftesting the magnitude of 
one individual' s satisfaction derived from a given income as compared 
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with that of another, and that the effort todo this inevitably necessitated 
value judgements. 
Introspection does not enable Ato measure what is going on in B' s mind, nor 
B to measure what is going on in A's. There is no way of comparing the 
satisfaction of different people (Robbins, 1935, p. 139). 
Keynes, however, did not associate scientificity exclusively with verifi-
cation through measurement, and thus did not regard the lack of meas-
urability and the attendent recourse to value judgement in introspection 
as an indication of non-objective judgement. 5 In part, he believed this 
because he believed value judgements could be objective in the sense of 
it being possible to say what an individual ought to think and feel in given 
circumstances, so that it was not necessary for example, as Robbins 
thought, to say that one could never compare two individuals' satisfaction 
with a given income. 
As a methodological approach, accordingly, introspection depends 
upon defending the possibility of there being certain kinds of value 
judgements - namely, those that are obje.ctive in the sense of being 
intersubjectively defensible. To be able to consult one' s own ímagined 
reaction to circumstances experienced by others, and treat this projected 
response as informative about others' motives and intentions, one must 
be able to say with confidence that, since individuals ought generally to 
be expected to respond to such circumstances in certain ways, one 's own 
projected response in a situation can be thought representative of those 
of others. This is, as noted above in connection with Keynes' s discussioil 
of 'the approximate uniformity of human organs', a matter of having 
sorne methodological foundation for explaining the intersubjective side 
ofhumanjudgement to accompany bis attention to individualjudgement. 
Both, it was argued, are necessary toan account of the representative 
individual employed in introspective analogical reasoning, since the 
individual consulting bis o·r her own case must be both distinct and 
typical of those whose behaviour is observe(( Robbins, unlike Keynes, 
was reluctant to attribute 'an approximate uniformity ofhuman organs' 
to individuals, and thus a capacity in judgement to individuals whereby 
economists' introspective judgements of others' thoughts and feelings 
could be thought legitimate. In effect, Robbins, saw but one dimension 
to human nature - namely, that especially subjective side that Keynes 
associated with the capacity for a distinctively individual judgement, and 
which is today associated with the complete exogeneity of taste. 
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CONCLUSION 
Keynes's moral science view of economics has received little attention, 
no doubt due in part to the inaccessibility of its philosophical founda-
tions, but also undeniably to the modem trend in methodological thinking 
that treats economics as what Keynes termed for Robbins a natural 
science. Keynes' s understanding, however, is provocative, in that it 
links this methodological conception to fundamental questions conceming 
the theory of the individual in economics. That is, since Keynes's 
implicit defence of introspection and judgements of value is rooted in a 
dual nature theory ofthe individual, the questionnaturally arises whether 
a justifiable commitment to this methodological approach entails a 
revision of economists' theory of the individual economic agent. In the 
discussion here, it should be emphasized, the plausibility of the more 
controversia! component ofKeynes 's view- 'the approximate uniformity 
of human organs' - has not been assessed. Nor, moreover, has the 
relationship between individual judgement and an intersubjectively 
objective human judgement been explored in a manner that provides 
much more than an introduction to the idea of the representative 
individual. These further investigations, nonetheless, are arguably central 
to an understanding of not just Keynes 's methodological views, but, 
more importantly, to an understanding of his theoretical strategies 
conceming the independent variables, 'in the first instance', of The 
General Theory- the propensity to consume, the marginal efficiency of 
capital schedule and the rate of interest (VII, p. 245). Accordingly, 
further investigation of these questions must necessarily take as its 
reference point the logic of the theory of the individual. 
NOTES 
l. Pennission to quote from unpublished manuscripts in the J.M. Keynes Papers in 
King's College Library was kindly granted by King's College, Cambridge Uni-
versity. Unpublished writings of J .M. Keynes © The Provost and Scholars of 
King's College, Cambridge, 1991. 
2. Compare, forexample, J.N. Keynes's remarks aboutintrospection (1955, p. 173). 
3. This seems to be Lionel Robbins's position, discussed below. 
4. The two passages from Keynes's unpublished writings quoted in the text are from 
'Miscellanea Ethica'. 
5. For Keynes's views on measurement of probabilities, see O'Donnell (1989). 
